The Declaration of Rome: Mogherinia��s greatest success


The Rome Agenda

On the day of the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, the 27 Leaders of the European Union signed a Declaration of unity in diversity, launching de facto the multi-speed management of further integration.

The Declaration states that (as Member States) a�?we will act together, at different paces and intensity where necessary, while moving in the same direction, as we have done in the past, in line with the Treaties and keeping the door open to those who want to join latera�?.

It also launches the so-called Rome Agenda, which is a pledge by Member States to actively work to achieve four main goals:

  1. A safe and secure Europe;
  2. A prosperous and sustainable Europe;
  3. A social Europe;
  4. A stronger Europe on the global scene[1]

Even though the four points of the Rome Agenda are, together, very pervasive and embracing all sorts of economic and social policies, it is to be noted that point 1 and 4 concern mainly the external dimension and its internal ramifications: they are, in fact, the crowning of Federica Mogherinia��s work in the past 3 years.


The Defence Union

The Rome Declaration was preceded by a meeting in Versailles by the a�?Formidable Foura�?, the Leaders of the four most powerful countries of the EU: Germany, France, Italy and Spain.

At that meeting, held on 6th March 2017, Merkel, Hollande, Gentiloni and Rajoy have agreed on making their own a�?Scenario 3a�? of Junckera��s White Paper[2], deciding to pursue the construction of a multi-speed Europe, with some countries integrating more and better than others,A�which might decide to stay in the free trade EU area without proceeding with further integration[3].

More specifically, the Versailles statement can be interpreted as a commitment by the core countries of the Union on treading on uncharted territories of the ever-closer integration both in the economic field, with the ultimate completion of the Economic and Monetary Union[4], and in other areas, such as common defence.

This idea was launched at a political level by the Italian Government of Matteo Renzi in August 2016, with an article by the Defence and Foreign Ministers Roberta Pinotti and Paolo Gentiloni, published in the Italian and French dailies a�?La Repubblicaa�? and a�?Le Mondea�?.

They called for the creation of a�?a kind of a Defence Uniona�?[5], probably mimicking Winston Churchilla��s words on the creation of a�?a kind of United States of Europea�?.

That political article initiated a game of negotiations between the Franco-German Axis and Italy, with the first simply proposing closer defence cooperation[6], and the latter actually proposing the creation of a European Army[7], in line with the intention by Renzia��s Government of working towards the creation of the United States of Europe[8], which might be seen only as a narrative framework, more than an actual goal, but one which has consequences on the overall management of Italian policies concerning the EU.

On 22nd November, the European Parliament adopted a non-binding resolution on European Defence Union proposing for it to be launched as a matter of urgency[9].

All of these pompous declarations, though, would probably result into fruitless action, if the entire framework for their realization and implementation had not been already laid out by the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, Federica Mogherini, in an evolving international environment that forged the most favourable conditions for the creation of the EDU: the current evolution of European integration is therefore the reaction of the Union to several external and internal factors and the ability of specific people to interpret them and acting accordingly in wise and bold ways a�� which is a condition that should never be taken for granted.


Ashtona��s legacy

The CFSP that Mogherini inherited from her predecessor Catherine Ashton was managed and thought of in a very different way compared to how it is today.

Ashton had been the first High Representative of the EU, the first a�?sort of Foreign Ministera�?[10] of the Union, a little-known British politician from the Labour Party, previously European Commissioner for Trade, but with no other experience in the domain of Foreign Relations.

Her inexperience and the infancy of her new working arrangements strongly contributed to the sense that she spent excessive amounts of time focusing inwards on the organizational aspects of the job and insufficient time developing the EUa��s international visibility[11].

Overall, after the Lisbon Treaty, and perhaps having as a contributing factor that the attention of the Union was focused elsewhere during the global financial crisis and the European Debt crisis, neither the Commission nor the High Representative have demonstrated an ability to act with the decisiveness or influence of a domestic Ministry.

Ms Ashton in particular, has been perceived as not able to negotiate as an equal with other security partners on security issues[12].

This, again, did not mean that the EU achieved nothing during Catherine Ashtona��s mandate for what concerns (CFSP[13] and CSDP[14]: on the contrary, following the Treaty of Lisbon, the ambition to a�?preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international securitya�? had become an explicit objective of the Union[15].

The EU, in the years preceding the European Debt Crisis, was becoming an effective security provider, and was increasingly being recognized as such, but it was still facing challenges, the greatest one from within. As the Representative outlined:

There is no agreed long-term vision on the future of CSDP. Decision-making on new operations or missions is often cumbersome and long. And securing Member Statesa�� commitment to supporting missions and operations, especially when it comes to accepting risk and costs, can be challenging, resulting in force generation difficulties. CSDP also faces recurrent capability shortfalls, either due to a lack of commitment or because the capabilities are not available, as well as various legal and financial constraints resulting in difficulties to act rapidly[16].”

These CSDP shortfalls became completely incapacitating as soon as European neighbourhoods became the theatre of game-changing events that drastically modified the international scenario, such as the Arab Springs, the Ukrainian crisis or the migrant crisis.

a�?Europea��s security environment has changed dramaticallya�?[17]: this is what the European Council concluded during the June 2015 Summit.

The end of the Ashton era and the beginning of the Mogherini era were indeed characterized by an increasing importance of Security in Europe, one that could not be ignored.

If the CFSP, with Mogherini, had kept being inward-looking, the EU would probably be far weaker today than it already is.

But what happened exactly that led from the immobilism of the Ashton era to the launch of the European Defence Union?


Matteo Renzia��s political gamble in Brussels

Italy has a greater role in the latest developments of European integration than it seems to want to admit.

Renzia��s appointment as Prime Minister was a small revolution in the Italian political scenario, locked in a 20 years old fight between centre-right Silvio Berlusconi and its opposition. He revolutionized his own party[18] with new, more economically liberal policies and a tendency to personalize politics, presenting every achievement of his Government as his own and not as his partya��s (an approach that ultimately led to his untimely downfall)[19].

On the other hand, during his first months in power, probably pushed by the initially great consensus Renzi enjoyed, the Partito Democratico (PD) won with a 40.8% majority the 2014 elections for the European Parliament, becoming the biggest component of the Socialists and Democrats European Parliamentary Group (S&D), the second biggest political cluster in the EP after the European Peoplea��s Party (EPP).

Renzi used this victory as a bargaining chip to make Italy obtain one of the most prestigious roles in the European Institutions pushing to make the Foreign Affairs Minister of his Government become the HR/VP of the newly established European Commission[20].

The reason why Renzi insisted in controlling the external dimension of the Union may probably be retraced in the specificity of Italya��s external challenges in 2013 and 2014, which were connected to the chaotic aftermath of the Arab Springs, one that the Union had been deliberately ignoring, leaving Italy alone in managing A�situations that are now considered to be some of the main challenges of Europe: the bloody beginning of the migrant crisis and its consequences.


Italy left alone: the Mediterranean death toll

Before the Arab Springs, arrivals of migrants to Europe from the Mediterranean routes had been relatively contained in number due to the agreements reached between Gaddafi and Berlusconi in 2008, which ensured that Lybia would a�?stop immigrants instead of sending them to Italya�? – as Umberto Bossi, leader of Lega Nord, one of the parties ruling Italy in a right-wing coalition at the time of the agreement, put it[21].

The military overthrow of Gaddafia��s Government, however, changed everything and Italy was forced to face an unprecedented wave of arrivals by sea. After Berlusconia��s and subsequently Montia��s insistence, the European Union launched Frontex Operation Hermes that would patrol the Mediterranean Sea in order to control immigration flows from Tunisia[22]. SuchA�operation was greatly unequipped and completely impotent in containing illegal human trafficking: at the time, in fact, smugglers and traffickers had already started using Lybia as their main base of operation,A�making the arrangements the EU had made with the Tunisian Government almost completely out of date[23].

To tackle the dramatic increase of migratory flows during the second half of the year 2013 and consequent tragic ship wreckages off the island of Lampedusa, Italy a�� on its own – launched Operation Mare Nostrum[24]. The name itself of the operation could be interpreted as a statement to whoever wanted to listen to it in Brussels: a�?Mare Nostruma�? was the name Ancient Romans had given to the Mediterranean Sea and it means a�?Our Seaa�? from Latin. Far from having any imperialist or nostalgic scent to it, the name could be interpreted as an implicit accusation: a�?Italy will protect the Mediterranean and save the lives that are lost therein. We, as Italians, do it because it is our sea, ours only, apparently, since no one else in Europe is trying to prevent the butchery that is happening therea�?.

Unlike Operation Hermes, Operation Mare Nostrum was very well equipped and its mandate was not limited to patrol and investigation: it was a huge search-and-rescue mission, with the ability to actively pursue smugglers[25].

The new Frontex Triton Operation, under Italian command, replaced such huge operation, deemed too costly for only one State to manage. Operation Triton was not a search-and-rescue mission and had a more limited patrol area for two reasons: one related to budget (the greater the patrol area, the greater the cost) and the other connected to the sea security dilemma (the greater the patrol area, the lesser the risk of crossing the Sea, the greater the number of people attempting the trip)[26].

An operation with such smaller extent, though, did not stop migrants from trying and making the crossing and Central Mediterranean remained the most dangerous and deadly border in the world[27].

Only after a shipwreck claimed the lives of more than 800 migrants in Central Mediterranean in April 2015[28], the European Council convened a special meeting in order to find a more fitting way to tackle more seriously the Mediterranean death toll crisis and human trafficking[29], which ultimately led to the launch of the EU military operation EUNAVFOR MED (Operation Sophia).


Italy left alone: the Dublin III paradox

(AP Photo/Vadim Ghirda)

Due to the Dublin III Regulation, however, asylum requests can only be examined by the countries of first arrival of the requester, putting borderline countries such as Italy and, subsequently, Greece in a very uncomfortable situation.

Prime Minister Matteo Renzi called out for the solidarity principle of the European Union and fought for and obtained[30] the temporary and exceptional relocation over two years from frontline Member States Italy and Greece to other Member States of 40.000 persons in clear need of international protection, in which all Member States would participate[31].

On 22nd September 2015, the Council raised the number of people to be relocated to 120 000, albeit facing great opposition on the issue from Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary[32].

Renzi was able to make the European Union admit that the migrant crisis is a solidarity and responsibility issue for the Union as a whole. Such admission, though, was forced at a time in which European solidarity was perceived to be lacking so much, that Renzi himself came to say to the Council that a�?there either is solidarity or you are wasting our time. (a��) If this is your idea of Europe, you can keep ita�?, also adding that his counterparts a�?are not worthy of being called a�?Europea�?a�?[33].

The migrant crisis saw Brussels leaving Rome alone, showed the disunity of Member States and their lack of solidarity, with a a�?too little, too latea�? approach that directly damaged Italian interest and that led to the death of thousands of innocent people. Securing control over the Uniona��s external dimension for Renzi was, therefore, a key national and political interest.

This is why he battledA�for A�the appointment of his Foreign Affairs Minister, Federica Mogherini, to High Representative and Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP) and he ultimately succeeded[34].


The announcement of the EU Global Strategy in 2015

Mogherinia��s actions were kept much undertone, but they soon started having concrete effects.

It was only afterA�her officialA�proposal thatA�the European Council adopted, on 22nd June 2015, a decision launching Operation EUNAVFOR MED, the European military operation in the southern Central Mediterranean aimed at minimizingA�the issue of the Mediterranean death toll, while fighting human trafficking and smuggling by Sea[35].

In June 2015 she announced the preparation of the first EU Global Strategy, clearly stating that:

a�?The European Union does not have the luxury to turn inwards. We have a responsibility to protect our citizens while promoting our interests and universal values. (a��) the EU has all the means to be an influential global player in future a�� if it acts together. In a world of incalculable risk and opportunity, crafting effective responses will hinge on the Uniona��s ability to adjust, react and innovate in partnership with others. We need a common, comprehensive and consistent EU global strategy.a�?

To set the priorities for the new EU global strategy, the High Representative launched a reflection process which meant to bring together together EU institutions, Member States and Civil Society. a�?We need to forge a new social contract with European citizens also through foreign policy.a�?.[36]

A Union that, as previously argued, shows disunity and lack of solidarity, however, may play deaf in front of such calls from an institutional figure that does not seem to have the diplomatic and political weight that the name should infer.

In fact, the whole management of the Ukrainian crisis reflected a negligence by some key Member States (Germany and France) towards the European dimension.


The hybrid multi-level management of CFSP until 2016

As it appeared before 2016, the amount of actors taking part to the definition of the EU common foreign and security policy transcends the original conception of CFSP, which saw only the European Council at its core (with a support/advisory role by other actors), having become a EU competence managed on a hybrid level by:

  • The European Council – canonically;
  • A collaboration between the Council and the EEAS in the management of CSDP operations
  • A strengthening political input by the HR/VP a�� through the Global European Agenda
  • A coordinated input of FAC and JHAC a�� through the European Agenda on Security
  • The acquiescence towards the de facto management of EU policies by non-mandated Member States

This hybrid management might denote a holistic and really pan-European and trans-sectorial evolution of CFSP, which would be a long-awaited change in the overall conception of Foreign Affairs of the European Union, but it does not take into account the wider picture: in order for such approach to work, a closer political integration needs to exist – oneA�that, at the time of the Ukrainian crisis, the Union did not have.

The EU was, until 2016, at a crossroad on Defence as much as on solidarity, needing to choose whether to continue with an intergovernmental approach, risking to become ineffective, or to give greater weight to the EUa��s management of CFSP and CSDP, making it more and more a Uniona��s prerogative, through a closer political union.

Mogherinia��s reform made the second choice a realistic one a�� but that did not mean it could not be ignored.


Brexit and the a�?marketing strategya�? of the Bratislava Declaration

Two key events happened in 2016, which even more than the migrant crisis, the Schengen crisis and the Ukrainian crisis put the existence of the Union at risk.

One was actually the end of the integration process by the United Kingdom, the so-called Brexit, officially commenced only on the 29th March 2017 with the activation by London of Article 50 TEU, but resulting from the decision of English and Welsh citizens through a referendum held on 23rd June 2016, one that forever shattered whatever illusion of irreversibility of European integration that anyone could have.

Brexit prompted the initiation of the a�?Bratislava processa�?, launched by the European Council in the capital of Slovakia.

“Although one country has decided to leave, the EU remains indispensable for the rest of us. In the aftermath of the wars and deep divisions on our continent, the EU secured peace, democracy and enabled our countries to prosper. Many countries and regions outside still only strive for such achievements. We are determined to make a success of the EU with 27 Member States, building on this joint history.”

The EU is not perfect but it is the best instrument we have for addressing the new challenges we are facing. We need the EU not only to guarantee peace and democracy but also the security of our people.

The Bratislava Summit, however, was at the time deemed to be a completely inadequate response to the existential crisis of the Union[37], more of a marketing operationA�than an actual plan a�� a perception mainly given by the text of the Bratislava Declaration itself, which stated:

We committed in Bratislava to offer to our citizens in the upcoming months a vision of an attractive EU they can trust and support.[38]

By the end of 2016, therefore, the Union appeared weaker and clueless, more than it had ever been, swept by the rise of populism and constantly on the brink of destruction because of the simple right to vote of its citizens a�� a right that could be used to elect anti-European leaders that might put an end to European integration, or to launch referenda leading to the voluntary self-ousting from the EU[39].


The EU Security and Defence Package

When Mogherini presented the EU Global Strategy, in June 2016, she did not start by stating that the EU should cooperate more in a specific sector of Defence or by mirror-climbing with vertiginous technicalities on CFSP and CSDP.

The first sentence of her presentation was a�?We need a strong European Union like never beforea�?.

The EU Global Strategy transcends the limits of the EEAS or of the common external policies a�� and rightly so: it is an admission, the ultimate realization that to achieve greater integration in the external field, to make the EU the global strategic actor numbers say it can be, there is no other chance but to strengthen the Union as a whole and proceed with closer integration with no further ado.

Failing to do so would prevent any effectiveness in the actions of the External Action Service.

On 17th October 2016, the EU Foreign Ministers adopted common conclusions on implementing the Global Strategy, deciding on the most important strategic priorities.

These are:

  1. Security and Defence: HR/VP, on 14th November 2016, produced a lengthy and detailed document, for the consideration of the European Council, proposing a a�?New Level of Ambitiona�?[40]. This document proposed several structural changes to CSDP and led to the creation, among others, of the Permanent Sovereign Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) as well to the establishment of a military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) within the existing Military Staff of the EU (MSEU) and under the political control of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) a�� therefore not under direct control of Member States[41];
  2. Building resilience and taking an integrated approach: not only the Union should become more resilient, but alsoA�civil society itself, with which the Institutions MUST work closely. The EU also supports an integrated approach to conflicts and crises, which means being fully engaged in all stages of a conflict, from early action and prevention, wherever possible to staying on the ground long enough for peace to take root[42];
  1. Strengthening the Internal/External Nexus: as the Schengen crisis and the migrant crisis had shown, external issues cannot be separated in their management from internal ones without damaging single Member States and/or the Union as a whole. The EU Global Strategy, therefore, also lays out the basis to promoting a more joined up Union, following the spirit of the Constitutional Treaty that had been partially abandoned, particularly in political terms, after the European stalemate of the early 2000s;
  2. Updating existing strategies or preparing new ones: the Global Strategy also expands its field of operation by promoting a�?effective climate diplomacy, energy diplomacy, economic diplomacy, and cultural diplomacya�?. Much like the Single European Act, it is a promise of extension of capabilities and a firm will of restricting the so-called a�?capabilities-expectations gapa�? of the Union, which is the difference between a�?what the EU has been talked up to do and what it is actually able to delivera�?, as defined by British Historian Christopher Hill[43];
  3. Enhancing public diplomacy: a�?The sustainable development goals will be a cross-cutting dimension of all this worka�? continues the text of the Global Strategy: a�?Human rights, peace and security, and gender equality and women’s empowerment are an integral part of all our policies. To ensure that a wide range of views are included, the EU Global Strategy and its implementation will continue to build on input from numerous outreach events and analysis of the research community.a�?

The EU Global Strategy appeared to be, therefore, a key document, outstretching far beyond the limits of CFSP, CSDP and the EEAS, a call for action and ambition by Federica Mogherini to the Leaders of the European Council, presented and prepared meticulously to be approved without any additional work by Member States’ Governments.


Trumpa��s approach to NATO: the ultimate uncertainty

In July 2016, in the last semester of the Obama Presidency, President of the Council of the EU Tusk, President of the European Commission Juncker and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg signed the Warsaw Joint Declaration, followed in December by follow-up measures by the European Council at the Foreign Ministers level that, building on the Berlin+ Agreements, meant to launch a�?a new era of cooperationa�? between EU and NATO.

The election of Donald Trump to President of the United States of America brought a new element of uncertainty to the Union, because of his statements over the North Atlantic Alliance.
On 7th February 2017, he vowed stout support for NATO, even if with some conditionality: “We strongly support NATO,” Trump said at the headquarters of US Central Command in Florida. “We only ask that all of the NATO members make their full and proper financial contributions to the NATO alliance, which many of them have not been doing. Many of them have not been even close. And they have to do that.”[44].

Only some days earlier, however, he had called the Alliance a�?obsoletea�? and he hoped to make a�?good deals with Russiaa�?, words that were welcomed with terror and dismay in many European countries, particularly the ones that are most worried aboutA�possible Russian aggression.

Trump also openly criticized Germanya��s management of the migrant crisis and the Emergency Relocation Mechanism, calling it a�?one very catastrophic mistakea�? and openly endorsed Brexit, offering his own personal opinion about it.

He stated that the UKa��s decision to leave the European Union will a�?end up being a great thinga�? and predicted that other countries would follow. a�?People, countries want their own identity, and the U.K. wanted its own identity,a�? he said.[45]

These statements were received by the President of the European Commission, Jean Claude Juncker, with annoyance and surprise: a�?If he goes on like that I am going to promote the independence of Ohio and Austin, Texas in the US,a�? he added.[46]

Ultimately, Trumpa��s stances on NATO actually put at risk the entire framework of cooperation between EU and NATO that was also boosted by Mogherinia��s work (even though it was mostly left out from the EU Global Strategy, mainly focused on EUa��s capabilities).

To add to that, Trump also threatened (and ultimately started) a trade war against all commercial partners, including European ones, showing complete and absolute lack of willingness in cooperation and openness, even with the closest of USa��s allies,[47] which clearly reflected very badly also from the point of view of intra-NATO cooperation.


The Uniona��s all in in Rome

In the wake of Trumpa��s Presidency, therefore, many Leaders of the EU felt of having been left alone to face a hostile international environment, and looked at the EU and not to the USA anymore as a possible last way of protecting themselves.

In this international environment, the Formidable Four met in Versailles and in this international environment, even countries like Poland, traditionally very cautious or even hostile over topics such as European common defence out of NATO frameworks[48] or the multi-speed Europe[49], decided to sign the Rome Declaration and to launch, together, the Rome Agenda.

What EU leaders were set in front of was a highway for closer integration: the adoption by the European Council of the reforms laid out by Federica Mogherini resulted in the creation of point 1 (a safe and secure Europe) and point 4 (a stronger Europe on the global scene), bringing with strength the external dimension and a clear pathway towards the European Defence Union back on the table after more than 60 years.

The EDU will be realized on Mogherinia��s terms and with a model, the multi-speed Europe, launched by Renzia��s Government with a clear federalist mark.

Finally, all of these achievements have not remained dead letter in some drawer in the offices of Brussels: they have actually obtained heavy POLITICAL impetus all over Europe at the Versailles Summit and on the 60th anniversary of the EEC.

THESE are the reasons why the Rome Declaration is Mogherinia��s greatest success.

Obviously, though, the new Agenda is not only about the possible construction of EDU.

A prosperous and sustainable Europe works in concert with the Global Strategy, but is actually the natural prosecution of the Five Presidenta��s Report on completing Europea��s Economic and Monetary Union[50], aimed at solving the problems that led to the European Debt Crisis, bringing the Euro from being a single currency to a common currency, useful to effectively tackle unemployment and all social issues that are connected, directly or indirectly, to the economy, to currency management and to the big, overwhelming role of Mario Draghia��s ECB.

Finally, the Rome Declaration resurrects Social Europe. This idea of EU was left out after the Eastward expansion of the Union in 2004, after which the United Kingdoma��s idea of integration prevailed, one founded on ideas such as a�?governancea�? instead of a�?governmenta�?, a�?flexibilitya�? instead of a�?full employmenta�? and a�?liberalizationa�? instead of a�?social security and welfarea�?, which, co-opted by Germana��s leadership, translated into a European Union driven by the economic and financial prowess of Member States, a management of the Neoliberal order that has been defined as a�?Ordoliberalisma�?[51].

With Brexit, though, the neoliberal approach in Europe has received a hard blow. The resurgence of Social Europe, talk over EDU and the effectiveness of Mogherini’s reforms might actually be considered as direct consequences of Brexit and the lack of UK’s opposition.A�

These transversal reforms are set to change the European Union forever, if met with the necessary ambition and commitment by at least some key Member States:A�they show the clear intention of the Union to change and become more a�?citizens-friendlya�?.

On the other hand, all of this labour might be in vain if, in the upcoming elections in France or in Italy, anti-European parties should come to power.
In France the Front National of Marine Le Pen has vowed to let French citizens hold a Brexit-style referendum on their countrya��s permanence in the Union[52] and in Italy both Lega Nord of Matteo Salvini and Movimento 5 Stelle, the two main opposition parties, have vowed to do the same[53].

The Rome Agenda is, therefore, an all-in of the current European order: either the Union will change completely, proceeding with reforms and further integration the like of which have not been seen since the European Constitution or the Maastricht Treaty, or it will simply come to an end with the voluntary self-ousting of either France or Italy.

The choice is, once again, ours a�� of European citizens, and it might decide the fate of generations to come.

Lorenzo Canonico is one of the Founders and Member of the Board of the Venice Diplomatic Society.

He is currently a Trainee at the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER).

He graduated in International Relations in 2016, defending a Master’s Dissertation on the European Union’s CFSP legal tools and its management of the migrant crisis and the Ukrainian crisis (The broken European Lighthouse).

Previously, he has been a Trainee at the Italian Embassy and the Italian Cultural Institute in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and has received high-level training for Human Rights OfficersA�by Scuola Sant’Anna di Pisa.



[2] EUROPEAN COMMISSION, White Paper on the Future of Europe (1st March 2017) available at:

[3] POLITICO In Versailles, EUa��s big 4 back multispeed Europe (6th March 2017) available at:

[4] JEAN CLAUDE JUNCKER in close cooperation with DONALD TUSK, JEROEN DIJSSELBLOEM, MARIO DRAGHI and MARTIN SCHULZ Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (22ND June 2015) available at:

[5] EUROPE INSIGHT Italian Ministers propose a European Defence Union (11 august 2016) available at:

[6] EU OBSERVER France and Germany propose EU a�?Defence Uniona�? (12 September 2016) available at:

[7] EU OBSERVER Italy lays out a�?visiona�? of EU Army (26th September 2016) available at:

[8] LA STAMPA Renzi: realizziamo il sogno degli Stati uniti da��Europa (30th June 2014) available at:

[9] EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Legislative train schedule available at:

[10] The role of a�?High Representative and Vice president of the European Commissiona�? or a�?HR/VPa�? was actually supposed to be established by the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe with the name of a�?Foreign Minister of the European Uniona�?, but after French rejection of the European Constitution the UK asked and obtained for the name to change, to give to the role a less a�?federalista�? tone (cf MICHELLE CINI &

NIEVES PA�REZ-A�a�?SOLORZANO BORRAGA?N European Union Politics 4th edition (Oxford University Press, 2012) p.248)

[11] MICHELLE CINI & NIEVES PA�REZ-A�a�?SOLORZANO BORRAGA?N European Union Politics 4th edition (Oxford University Press, 2012) p.248

[12] BOSSONG R. Assessing the EUa��s added value in the area of terrorism prevention and radicalization (Economics of Security WP 60) cf the parts concerning the HR negotiations with the US Department for Homeland Security on the Passenger Name record (PNR) transfer

[13] CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy

[14] CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy


[16] CATHERINE ASHTON Final report by the High Representative and Head of EDA on the Common Security and Defence Policy (15th October 2013)

[17] EUROPEAN COUNCIL Presidency Conclusions, II.Security and Defence Art. 10 (25th a�� 26th June 2015)

[18] Matteo Renzia��s Party is the Partito Democratico (PD a�� Democratic Party) a centre-left political force and the second one in terms of votes at the last national political elections of 2013, right after Movimento 5 Stelle.

[19] IL FATTO QUOTIDIANO Referendum, la retromarcia del premier Renzi: a�?Ho fatto un errore a personalizzare troppoa�? (9th august 2016) available at:

[20] FINANCIAL TIMES Fresh fight breaks out over top EU roles (13th July 2014) available at:

[21] CORRIERE DELLA SERA Berlusconi da Gheddafi: Siglato la��accordo (30th august 2008) available at:

[22] FRONTEX website:

[23] FRONTEX FRAN QuarterlyA� (Quarter 2 April-June 2013) p.20


[25] BUNDESZENTRALE FA?R POLITISCHE BILDUNG Flucht nach Europa: Das Mittelmeer ist der gefA�hrlichste GrenzA?bergang der Welt (14th November 2014) available at:

[26] REUTERS Migrants’ bodies brought ashore as EU proposes doubling rescue effort (20th April 2015) available at:


Migrant border-related deaths worldwide (January-September 2014)

South Africa 17

Caribbean 45

Sahara 56

South East Asia 70

Horn of Africa 123

Bay of Bengal 205

US/Mexico border 230

East Africa 251

Mediterranean 3072

[28] REUTERS Migrants’ bodies brought ashore as EU proposes doubling rescue effort (20th April 2015) available at:

[29] SPECIAL MEETING OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL Statement Art.3 (23rd April 2015)

[30] LA STAMPA La��UE litiga ancora sulle quote migranti. Renzi: a�?Ci fate solo perdere tempoa�? (25th June 2015) available at:

[31] EUROPEAN COUNCIL Presidency Conclusions, Art.4 (25th a�� 26th June 2015)

[32] REPUBBLICA Migranti: “SA�” al piano di ricollocamento per 120mila. Via libera a maggioranza, blocco Est contrario (22nd September 2015) available at:

[33] LA STAMPA La��UE litiga ancora sulle quote migranti. Renzi: a�?Ci fate solo perdere tempoa�? (25th June 2015) available at:

[34] Federica Mogherinia��s role as Italian Foreign Affairs minister was given, after her appointment as HR/VP, to Paolo Gentiloni, who, subsequently to Matteo Renzia��s resignation in December 2016, became the new Italian Prime Minister.

[35] COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a European Military Operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) (18th May 2015)

[36] FEDERICA MOGHERINI Global Strategy to steer EU external action in an increasingly connected, contested and complex world available at

[37] THE TELEGRAPH Bratislava summit: Europea��s ‘united fronta�� proves a fragile facade as leaders refuse to share a stage (16th September 2016) available at:

[38] BRATISLAVA DECLARATION AND ROADMAP (16th September 2016) available at:

[39] CNBC Investors beware: 5 risks that can unravel the EU in 2017 (15th February 2017) available at:

[40] FEDERICA MOGHERINI Implementation plan on security and defence (14th November 2016) available at:

[41] COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS (6th March 2017) available at:

[42] EU GLOBAL STRATEGY available at:

[43] CHRISTOPHER HILL The capability-expectations gap or conceptualizing Europea��s international role from Journal of Common Market Studies (1993) pp. 305-328

[44] CNN Trump salutes NATO with vow of strong support (7th February 2017) available at:

[45] NEW YORK TIMES Trump Criticizes NATO and Hopes for a�?Good Dealsa�� With Russia (15th January 2017) available at:

[46] RUSSIA TODAY Trump better stop encouraging EU secession or kiss Texas goodbye, warns Juncker (30th March 2017) available at:

[47]REUTERS EU chief Juncker warns against EU-US trade war: Bild am Sonntag (18th March 2017) available at:A�A�

[48]SPUTNIK NEWS Creation of EU Army Remains Possible in Future, Not Now – Polish FM (21st November 2016) available at:

[49] RADIO POLAND PM warns Poland may not accept Rome Declaration (23rd March 2017) available at:,PM-warns-Poland-may-not-accept-Rome-Declaration

[50] JEAN CLAUDE JUNCKER in close cooperation with DONALD TUSK, JEROEN DIJSSELBLOEM, MARIO DRAGHI and MARTIN SCHULZ Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (22ND June 2015) available at:

[51] EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS The Long Shadow of Ordoliberalism (27th July 2012) available at:

[52] RUSSIA TODAY Frexit: Le Pen promises to take France out of EU & NATO (24th December 2016) available at:

[53] WALL STREET ITALIA Italia, con coalizione M5S-Lega sarebbe a�?fine euroa�? (2nd February 2017) available at: